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Abstract
This paper studies the in￿uence of diﬀerent modelling assumptions on the stability of
the steady state in one￿sector models of economic growth with externalities in the pro-
duction function. We start with a standard Benhabib&Farmer 1994 one￿sector model
and study the combined eﬀect on the stability of variable capital utilization, progres-
sive taxation, and productive public spending subject to congestion. As was shown
earlier by Wen 1998, variable capacity utilization leads to indeterminacy or absolute
instability for low degrees of social increasing returns to scale. Introduction of produc-
tive public spending further lowers the degree of IRS necessary to break saddle￿path
stability of the steady state. The degree of progressivity of the tax schedule in￿uences
only the indeterminate and absolute unstable regions in the space spanned by exter-
nality parameters. More progressive tax schedule increases the area of indeterminacy
at the expense of the absolute instablity region. We perform calibration of the model
to the tax regimes observed in the USA.
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Early indeterminacy literature relied on one￿sector models and unrealistically
high degrees of increasing returns to scale on the social level due to the presence
of externalities, see Benhabib and Farmer (1994). Indeterminacy also meant
that labor demand curve was upward sloping and steeper than the labor supply
curve. These undesirable properties of one￿sector models were ameliorated by
introducing variable capital utilization, a standard feature of RBC models, in
Wen (1998), and non￿separable in consumption and leisure utility function in
Bennett and Farmer (2000). Both extensions allow indeterminacy of the steady
state with labor demand and supply crossing with standard slopes and the
degree of increasing returns to scale that is relatively low and can be reconciled
with the empirical estimates of Basu and Fernald (1997).
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) and Guo (1999), among others, studied
the in￿uence of taxation on indeterminacy. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997)
￿nds that following a balanced budget rule with a ￿xed level of government
expenditure can be destabilizing (lead to indeterminacy of the steady state),
while Guo (1999) prove that progressive taxation leads to a higher likelihood of
a saddle￿path stable steady state. In these models the public spending collected
through taxes does not enter households￿ utility function or ￿rms￿ production
function.
Cazzavillan (1996) introduces public spending that enters both households￿
utility function and ￿rms￿ production function in a model with a simple ￿at
tax. When public spending has increasing returns in households￿ utility, inde-
terminate steady state becomes possible. However, this model uses ￿xed labor
supply and thus cannot be compared directly to the models considered above.
The same consideration applies to Park and Philippopoulos (2002), where a
similar structure is used, but the government now allocates the public good be-
tween households and ￿rms optimally. The balanced growth path in the model
is determinate, and the model does not allow transitional dynamics. Zhang
2(2000) has productive public spending that at the same time enters households￿
utility function. It is easy to show that his model is mathematically equivalent
to Benhabib and Farmer (1994), as public spending plays the role similar to that
of labor eﬀort. Finally, Bruha (2003) uses productive public spending subject to
congestion in the framework of a two￿sector open economy model with inelastic
labor supply. Fiscal policy in the model consists in collecting taxes (￿at rate)
and allocating the tax revenue between productive pubic spending and transfers
to the households. This model is closest to the one we are using in this paper;
however, we concentrate on one￿sector model with elastic labor supply which
c a nb es o l v e de x p l i c i t l y .
The goal of the present papre is to introduce productive public spending
￿nanced by a progressive tax into a standard Benhabib&Farmer￿type one￿sector
growth model with elastic labor supply and variable capital utilization. We
study the interplay between productive public spending and progressive nature
of the tax in generating indeterminacy of the steady state, keeping the degree
of increasing returns to scale low. The latter objective is achieved by allowing
variable capital utilization. Increased returns to scale are introduced through
externalities of the production function and through public spending. Finally,
we de￿ne the model in such a way that it belongs to a broad class of models,
descended from Benhabib and Farmer (1994), which could be reduced to a two￿
dimensional system of Lotka￿Volterra diﬀerential equations. Such reduction
allows a uniform mathematical treatment of the whole model class.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains description
of our model. In Section 3 we discuss stability of the steady state and in￿uence
of diﬀerent parameter values on its (in)determinacy. Section 4 contains a look at
the calibrated parameter values and the likelihood of obtaining indeterminacy
steady state, and Section 5 concludes.
32T h e M o d e l
Our model is a deterministic continuous￿time model with in￿nitely lived agents.
It extends Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Wen (1998), and Guo (1999). It is
characterized by increasing social returns to scale due to externality in the pro-
duction function and productive public spending. Agents take changes in the
productivity parameter caused by the externality and public good as given.
Government has control over the tax regime. Households choose values of con-
sumption, work eﬀort, and capital utilization rate. There are two steady states:
one with zero capital and zero consumption (the origin), the other with positive
levels of both capital and consumption. For some parameter values, both steady
states are indeterminate, and the whole state space is separated into two regions
of attraction of the steady states. We will concentrate on the positive steady
state and study its (in)determinacy as the model parameters vary.








)e−ρtdt, A > 0, (1)
where C and N are household consumption and working hours, χ > 0. If χ =0
we have utility function with indivisible labor. Households own capital and run
￿rms, and their budget constraint is given by
•
Kt =( 1− τ)Yt − Ct − ξuθ
tKt,K (0) given, (2)
where Yt is the ￿rm￿s output, τ the tax rate, and Kt the household￿s capi-
tal stock. Capital depretiation rate depends on the capital utilization rate ut.
Choosing θ > 1 guarantees interior equilibrium with ut < 1, see Wen (1998).






, Ψ ∈ [0,1], φ ∈ [0,1), (3)
where Yt is the household income. Parameters φ and Ψ determine the slope and
the level of tax schedule. φ not equal to 0 means ￿progressive￿ tax, because
in this case the marginal tax rate is higher than the average one, see Guo
4(1999). In a departure from that paper which uses the steady state value of
income as a benchmark to determine household￿s tax rate, in this paper Y t is
the economy￿wide average income. The diﬀerence means that in a symmetric
equilibrium where every household has the same amount of capital, supplies
the same number of hours, and uses the same capital utilization rate, tax rate
does not depend on the current average output. In Guo (1999), the symmetric
equilibrium average tax rates are decreasing in the average level of output, thus
generating strongly procyclical government spending. The variant used here
corresponds to the case when the whole tax schedule is set by law and changed
only unfrequently, which in our opinion more closely resembles the reality.












where η > 0 and σ > 0. Public spending is productive (η is positive) and is
taken as given by every household. K and N a r ee c o n o m y ￿ w i d ea v e r a g e so fK
and N per ￿rm and are also taken as given by the households. Public spending
is subject to congestion, as in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992).
The government balances its budget at every point in time. Therefore, there
is no government debt in the model.
The current value Hamiltonian is given by (we drop time subscript for clarity
from now on)










Y − C − ξuθK
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. (5)
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5together with the capital accumulation equation
•
K =( 1− τ)Y − C − ξuθK, K(0) given. (7)
In a symmetric perfect foresight equilibrium every household has the same
amount of capital, supplies the same number of hours, and every ￿rm employs
the same quantity of capital and labor, therefore Y = Y, K = K, N = N,
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K. Expression for Y as a function of C
and K can be found by combining (6b), (6c), (4), and G =( 1−Ψ)Y. Switching
to logs, c = log(C),k= log(K),y= log(Y ), and solving for y as a function of
c and k, we obtain the following expression for y as a function of c and k,
y = w − (v − 1)k − uc,
with values of w, u, and v given in the Appendix, equation (17). In the log
variables the two diﬀerential equations above are given by
•
c = Ψα(1 − φ)(1 −
1
θ
)exp(w − vk − uc) − ρ, (8a)
•
k = Ψ(1 −
α(1 − φ)
θ
)exp(w − vk − uc) − exp(c − k). (8b)
Finally, changing the coordinates to
x =e x p ( w − vk − uc), (9a)
y =e x p ( c − k), (9b)
we get the system of equations presented below,
•





) − uΨα(1 − φ)(1 −
1
θ




y = y ￿
‰
[Ψα(1 − φ)(1 −
1
θ
) − Ψ(1 −
α(1 − φ)
θ
)]x + y − ρ
￿
. (10b)
By construction, x and y are nonnegative, therefore only the ￿rst quadrant
of the (x,y) space should be considered. Note that the previous system has the
6following form,
•
x = x(a1x + b1y + c1), (11a)
•
y = y(a2x + b2y + c2), (11b)
which is the Lotka￿Volterra system of diﬀerential equations. Transformed vari-
able x is proportional to the interest rate r, while y is simply the ratio of con-
sumption to the capital. A number of continuous￿time models similar to Ben-
habib and Farmer (1994) could be reduced to this form, in particular Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (1997), Wen (1998), Zhang (2000), and others. The system
(11) is very simple and allows constructing of the global phase portrait. In
particular, there are no limit cycles. For some parameter values this system
can have two stable (indeterminate) steady states, one with positive values of
x and y and another the origin, in which case the whole positive quadrant
{x,y|x>0,y > 0} is separated into the regions of attraction of the positive
steady state (x∗,y ∗) and of the origin (0,0).I ti sa l s op o s s i b l et oh a v e(x∗,y∗)
stable and (0,0) a saddle, in which case the whole positive quadrant becomes
region of attraction of the positive steady state.











As stated in the ￿rst section, we are interested in values of parameters that lead
to indeterminacy under suﬃciently low degrees of increasing returns to scale.
Plugging G =( 1− Ψ)Y into (4) and switching to logs, one gets
y = const +
α(1 + σ) − η
(1 − η)
k +
(1 − α)(1 + σ)
(1 − η)
n, (12)








1−η > 1 for positive σ and η. Assuming η ¿ 1, this expression can be
written approximately as 1+σ + ση. Therefore, the eﬀect of productive public
spending on the degree of increasing returns to scale is only of the second order.
7This feature of the result is caused by the fact that productive public spending
is subject to congestion. On the other hand, if stability propoerties of the
steady state (x∗,y∗) depend on η in a non￿trivial way, it might be possible to
generate indeterminacy through η rather than σ, externality parameter, thus
preserving low aggregate returns to scale. We will consider a pair of (σ,η)a s
basic parameters for our stability discussion.
Our model has one predetermined variable (k)a n do n ef r e e( c). Other non￿
predetermined variables controlled by the households, u and N,are functions of c
and k in the interior equilibrium which is assumed here. Therefore, steady state
(x∗,y∗) is determinate, indeterminate, and absolutely unstable (explosive) if the
Jacobian of (10) evaluated at the steady state has one, two, and zero eigenvalues
with negative real parts.
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Determinant of J∗ is given by −Ψ(u + v)α(1 − φ)(1 − 1
θ). Assumptions on
parameters (φ < 1, θ > 1)m e a nt h a tdet(J∗) is positive iff u + v<0. In
this case the steady state (x∗,y∗) can be indeterminate or absolutely unstable,
depending on the value of Tr(J∗). Using values of u and v given in the Appendix,
expression u + v c a nb ew r i t t e na s
u+v =
θ(1 + χ)(1 − α(1 + σ))
α(θ − 1) + χ(θ − α) − η(1 + χ)(θ − 1) − σ[θ(1 − α)+α(1 + χ)]
. (13)
Both numerator and denominator of (13) are linear functions of σ and η. There-
fore, the requisite condition u+v<0 is given by two regions in the (σ,η)s p a c e
bounded by straight lines. The numerator is positive for σ ≤ 1
α − 1. Given
that α is usually calibrated at 0.3￿0.4, this constraint is not binding for rea-
sonable values of σ. The denominator of (13) equals α(θ−1)+χ(θ−α) > 0 for
σ = η =0and is decreasing function of both σ and η because both (1+χ)(θ−1)
and θ(1−α)+α(1+χ) are positive. Therefore, (13) is negative (and det(J∗) is
positive) in the region of (σ,η) space above the downward sloping straight line
A in Figure 1.
8Let us turn our attention to Tr(J∗) given by Ψ[−v(1 −
α(1−φ)
θ ) − uα(1 −
φ)(1 − 1
θ)]x∗ + y∗. Calculations (given in the Appendix) demonstrate that
Tr(J∗)=
ρ(θ − 1)
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The term on the ￿rst line is always positive, that on the second line is negative
if (13) is negative, and the third line is, once again, a linear function in σ and
η. When σ = η =0 , the term in ￿gure parentheses equals
α
•
(1 + χ)(1 −
α(1 − φ)
θ
) − (1− α)(1 − φ)
‚
and is always positive as shown in the Appendix. The term in ￿gure parentheses
equals zero along the line B in Figure 1, which crosses vertical axis at (0,−1)
and is upward sloping. It is positive above the line B.
Region of the (η,σ) space generating indeterminate steady state (det(J∗) >
0,T r (J∗) < 0)i st h ea r e at h a ti sa tt h es a m et i m eb e l o wt h el i n eσ = 1
α − 1,
above line A, and above line B.1 Line A crosses the η axis to the right of the
line B for any parameter values (see Appendix for the proof). Therefore, there
exists a value of (σmin,η∗) at which indeterminacy is achieved. For smaller
values of σ the steady state is either determinate or explosive. The value of
(σmin,η∗) corresponds to a minimum degree of increasing returns to scale that
is necessary to generate indeterminate steady state, IRSmin > 1. Stability of
the steady state for smaller IRS values depends on the slope of the line A.I f
absolute value of this slope is greater than IRSmin, then the steady state can
be determinate or explosive. For IRS values close to 1, only the possibility of
a determinate steady state remains. If slope of A is smaller than IRSmin, than
the steady state for IRS <IRSmin can be indeterminate or deteminate. Again,
when IRS is close to 1 the only outcome is determinate steady state. As is easy
1Intersection with the opposite signs ￿ above the line σ = 1
α − 1, the line A,a n db e l o w
line B ￿i sa ne m p t ys e t .
9to see (calculation in the Appendix), absolute value of the slope of line A is less
than one for χ =0(indivisible labor). For values of IRS slightly larger than
IRSmin, one could observe all three outcomes: indeterminate, determinate, and
explosive steady state.
Notice that for some values of η, it is possible to move from indeterminate
to explosive steady state by lowering σ and decreasing the returns to scale.
For large η, σ =0(constant returns to scale on the social level) generates
explosive, rather than determinate, steady state. This behavior is similar to the
one observed in the original Benhabib and Farmer (1994) model, where for β
large enough, relatively small values of α result in explosive steady state.
Given the values of parameters determining the degree of increasing returns
to scale, stability of the steady state depend on three other parameter values: χ,
θ, and φ. Notice that stability does not depend on ρ, which is a usual outcome
if variable capital utilization is modeled as in this paper. Stability also does not
depend on Ψ, one minus the symmetric equilibrium tax rate.
As demonstrated in the Appendix, increase in χ moves the points of inter-
section of line A with both axes upward. Therefore, the region of the (η,σ)
space where the steady state is determinate increases. Line B rotates clockwise
as χ increases, therefore increasing the region of indeterminacy at the expense
of explosive region. It is impossible to say what happens to the value σmin ￿
the minimum degree of externality necessary for indeterminacy. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (1997) show that higher χ makes indeterminacy of the steady state
less likely to obtain.
The steady state value of the depreciation rate is a decreasing function of the
parameter θ. Usual conclusion in one￿sector models is that higher depreciation
rate makes indeterminacy easier to achieve, see, for example, Figure 1 in Wen
(1998). In the current model, the result is not easy to predict: an increase in
θ moves the point of intersection of the line A with σ axis up, but intersection
with η axis decreases. Line B rotates clockwise. The eﬀect on σmin a n do nt h e
relative mass of indeterminate, determinate, and explosive regions is impossible
10to derive analytically.
Finally, an increase in φ ￿ higher progressivity of the tax schedule ￿ does
not in￿uence line A at all. Line B rotates clockwise around the point (0,−1).
Therefore, the region of (η,σ) space where the steady state is determinate does
not change, but indeterminate region increases at the expense of the explosive
one. This outcome can be contrasted with Guo (1999), where more progressivity
(higher φ) is stabilizing. However, in a two￿sector model of Guo and Harrison
(2001) progressive tax schedule can be both stabilizing and destabilizing.
4 Calibration of the tax schedule
For the calibration exersize we use the same baseline parameters values as Wen
(1998): α =0 .3, χ =0 , θ =1 .4.
Calibration of the degree of progressivity of the tax schedule φ can proceed
along two paths. The ￿rst way is to use IRS data on individual tax returns.
The data lists average tax as a share of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) for the
returns that do claim income tax and the share of returns with no tax, see
IRS (Winter 2002). Assuming that all taxpayers are located in the middle of
reported income brackets, we can derive the total amount of income tax paid
by the taxpayers in this income bracket. Equation (3) then gives disposable




t or log(DPI)=const+(1− φ)log(Y ). Assuming
that AGI=Y, it is then possible to estimate parameter φ from a simple linear
regression. This estimate is necessarily very imprecise, because income and AGI
can diﬀer signi￿cantly, and calculating the extent of this diﬀerence is diﬃcult.
Nevertheless, the results could be taken as a guideline for other calibration
methods. For the 2000 data, this calibration method gives φ from 0.046 (if the
whole range of the data is used) to 0.066 (when data points with AGI below
$3,000 and above $1,500,000 are excluded).
The second method of calibrating φ is as follows. We start from an assump-
tion that distribution of income in the population follows a Gamma distribution
with parameters α and β. Gamma distribution has been used to approximate the
11true distribution of income among households, see Dragulescu and Yakovenko
(2001) and Ferrero (2003). Gamma distribution has a non￿zero mode for values
of α greater than one, and can resemble log￿normal distribution that is usually
used to approximate the distribution of income.
The Gini coeﬃcient is the area between 45◦ l i n ea n dt h eL o r e n zc u r v er e p -
resenting the distribution of income. Horizontal coordinate x(r) of this curve
represents the cumulative fraction of population with income below r, and the
















(x − y)dx. (15)
For details, see Dragulescu and Yakovenko (2001). If one assumes that the pre￿
tax income distribution P is given by a gamma distribution with parameters α









Assuming the progressive tax of the form used in this paper, after￿tax income




t .T oc a l c u l a t ep o s t ￿
tax Gini index, one then substitutes ΨY
φ
t s1−φ instead of s into the formula for
y(r) above. The expression under the integral becomes a probability density
function of a gamma distribution with diﬀerent α but the same β. Calculating




f(r,α,1) • [F(r,α,1) − F(r,α +1− φ,1)]dr = (16a)
1 − 2 •
∞ Z
0




f(r,α +1− φ,1) • F(r,α,1)dr − 1. (16c)
12Here f(r,α,1) and F(r,α,1) are p.d.f and c.d.f. of the gamma distribution with
parameters α and 1, respectively.
To calibrate φ, one then needs only two numbers: pre￿tax and post￿tax
Gini coeﬃcients. Pre￿tax coeﬃcient is used to determine α, and parameter
φ is chosen so that formulae (16) produce empirically observed post￿tax Gini
coeﬃcient.
The data for this calibration method are taken from the Current Population
Reports on consumer income by the US Census Bureau, see Jones and Weinberg
(2000). US Census Bureau compiles data on consumer income together with sev-
eral experimental measures of income, including pre￿tax and post￿tax income.
Figure 7 in Jones and Weinberg (2000) contains Gini coeﬃcients for pre￿tax
and post￿tax household income from 1993 to 1998. The algorithm described
above shows that the pre￿tax income distribution can be approximated by the
gamma distribution with α from 1.24 to 1.30, and the degree of progressivity of
the tax, φ, varies from 0.086 to 0.103.
Direct estimation of φ requires access to the raw USCB data for consumer
income, taxes paid, and post￿tax income.
For a value of φ on the upper side of our estimated range, 0.10, indeterminacy
can be observed if degrees to scale on the social level are above 1.0304, or 3%
increased returns to scale. This value is extremely low. If we set η equal to
zero, the minimal returns to scale jumps to at least 9% (line A intersects σ axis
slightly above 1.09, therefore indeterminacy is impossible for lower values of σ
and increasing returns to scale). On the other hand, such a low value of returns
to scale is compatible with indeterminacy only if productivity of the ratio of the
￿ow of public spending to the ￿ow of capital services is relatively high, 0.22. As
noted in the previous section, η adds only second￿order terms to the returns to
scale, but in￿uences stability to the ￿rst order.
Figures 2 through 4 present the eﬀect of changes in the basic parameters,
θ, χ, and φ, on the minimun level of increasing returns to scale necessary to
generate indeterminacy. A small increase in χ reduces the area of the (η,σ)
13space in which saddle￿path stability is not observed and thus is stabilizing. The
minimal degree of returns to scale increases slightly. This outcome is consistent
with the ￿ndings of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) where higher values of
χ mean that indeterminacy is less likely (one needs much higher tax rates to
generate indeterminacy). Similar outcome is observed in Wen (1998).
An increase in θ (and corresponding decrease in the steady state depretia-
tion rate) has similar eﬀects: the area of the (η,σ) space in which saddle￿path
stability is not observed is reduced, and thus the change is stabilizing. However,
there is essentially no in￿uence on the minimal degree of returns to scale. Again,
this result is consistent with Wen (1998), where a decrease in depretiation rate
(increase in θ) lead to the decrease in the area of parameter space generating
indeterminacy by requiring higher degrees of returns to scale; for the value of
the depretiation rate 0.10 (this corresponds to θ =1 .4 used both in Wen (1998)
and here), this decrease is very small.
Finally, a reduction of φ from 0.10 to 0.08 leads to a large increase of the
area of the the (η,σ) space in which steady state is explosive. Minimal degree
of returns to scale necessary to generate indeterminacy increases by less than
one percentage point. As explained above, the change of φ does not in￿uence
the area of the (η,σ) space in which saddle￿path stability is obtained. This
result is in direct contrast with Guo (1999), where more progressivity (higher
φ) is stabilizing. However, note that in a two￿sector model of Guo and Harrison
(2001) progressive tax schedule can be both stabilizing and destabilizing. In our
model, an increase in φ could mean both increase and decrease in the minimal
degree of returns to scale necessary to obtain indeterminacy (the result depends
on the relative slopes of the line A and iso￿IRS line on Figure 1; for values
of χ that are high enough, line A could become less steep than the iso￿IRS
l i n e ,a n da ni n c r e a s ei nφ will mean hgher minimal degree of IRS necessary for
indeterminacy).
What can we say about the slope of the labor demand curve when parameter
values imply indeterminacy, say, near the point (σmin,η∗)? Treating capital
14utilization rate u as a ￿xed parameter, the slope of the labor demand curve (in
log￿log coordinates) is given by










1−η = IRSmin − 1 and is extremely low at (σmin,η∗). 1−α
1−η
could be less than one near η∗ because the line B crosses the η axis to the
left of α and the line A to the right of α, therefore η∗ c o u l db eo nt h ee i t h e r
side of α. For the baseline parametrization used here, η∗ < α, see Figure 1.
Therefore. the labor demand slopes downward ￿ slope equals −0.078 for the
baseline parametrization. For this parametrization, the whole area of the (η,σ)
space shown in Figures 2 through 4 generates a downward sloping labor demand
curve.
5 Goodness￿of￿￿tm e a s u r e s
To be written.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We combined several previously described extentions of a basic one￿sector model
with externalities: variable capital utilization, progressive tax schedule, and
productive public spending. Variable capital utilization allows one to keep the
degree of returns to scale, at which saddle￿path stability of the steady state
disappears, very low. It also allows one to generate indeterminate steady state
with downward sloping labor demand curve. Progressive taxation was shown
to favor saddle-path stability in one￿sector models and to have mixed eﬀects in
two￿sector model. Modeling productive government spending with elastic labor
supply has not been attempted before.
Theoretical analysis of the stability conditions shows that the stability, in
addition to the externality parameter σ and public expenditures exponent η,
depends only on 4 parameters: capital share α; inverse of the Frish labor sup-
ply elasticity with respect to wage, χ; capital utilization parameter θ (steady
15state depretiation rate is a decreasing function of θ); a n dt h et h ed e g r e eo fp r o -
gressivity of the tax code. We were interested in mapping the (η,σ) space for
values of parameters leading to saddle￿path stable, indeterminate, or explosive
steady state. The stability does not depend on the discount rate ρ; this result
seems to be common to one sector continuous￿time models if the variable capital
utilization rate is modeled as in Wen (1998).
The most clear results are obtained with respect to φ and χ. Increased pro-
gressivity of the tax schedule does not in￿uence the area of the (η,σ) space in
which saddle-path stability obtains; it increases the indeterminate region at the
expense of the explosive one. On the other hand, increased χ (lower elasticity
of the labor supply) makes saddle￿path stability easier to obtain and decreases
the explosive region in the (η,σ) space. Eﬀect of θ is impossible to qualify ana-
lytically, but for the baseline parametrization used here higher θ (lower steady
state depretiation rate) has an eﬀect similar to the increase in χ.
The degree of returns to scale necessary to generate indeterminate steady
state is extremely low in the model. For the baseline parametrization, it is given
by 1.03 and is well within the range estimated by Basu and Fernald (1997). It
is possible to obtain indeterminacy with downward sloping labor demand curve.
We discussed two methods of calibrating the degree of progressivity φ of the
tax schedule. We attempted to use IRS data on personal income tax returns
to calibrate this parameter. This approach suﬀers from the necessity to use
Adjusted Gross Income instead of the true personal income and given values
of φ in the 0.046 ￿ 0.066 interval. An alternative approach is to assume that
pre￿tax household income is distributed according to a gamma distribution, and
calibrate parameter α of the gamma distribution and φ so that pre￿tax and post￿
tax Gini coeﬃcients, derived from the theoretical distribution, corresponded to
the ones reported in the Current Population Reports by the US Census Bureau.
This approach gives a range of 0.086￿0.103 for the parameter φ. This approach
suﬀers from the necessity to assume original income distribution and using only
one statistics ￿ Gini coeﬃcients ￿ to derive the parameters of interest. A
16better usage of the US Census Bureau data might result in a more reliable
estimate of the parameter φ.
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DEN =( 1 − η)θ(1 + χ) − (α(1 + σ) − η)(1+χ) − (1 − α)(1+σ)θ. (17d)
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.
First, let calculate (1− v):
(1 − η)θ(1 + χ) − (α(1 + σ) − η)(1+χ) − (1 − α)(1+σ)θ − θχ[1 − α(1 + σ)] + θσ
DEN
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θ ) − (1 − α)(1 − φ)
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A.3 Nonnegativity of (1 + χ)(1 −
α(1−φ)
θ ) − (1 − α)(1 − φ).
Rewrite
(1 + χ)(1 −
α(1 − φ)
θ
) − (1 − α)(1 − φ) (18)
as 1+χ − (1 − φ)
£1+χ
θ α +1− α
⁄
. For large χ the term in square parentheses
could become negative turning the whole expression negative. However, notice
that for χ =0 , this expression is given by
1 − (1 − φ)
•













Moreover, the derivative of the (18) w.r.t. χ is given by 1 −
(1−φ)α
θ > 0, w.r.t.
φ is
£1+χ
θ α +1− α
⁄
> 0, and the second mixed derivative is α
θ > 0. Therefore,
for any positive φ and χ (18) is positive.
A.4 Intersections with the η axis.
Line B intersects the η axis at
η = α
(1 + χ)(1 −
α(1−φ)
θ ) − (1 − α)(1 − φ)







(1 − α)(1 − φ)





19Line A intersect the η axis at
η =
α(θ − 1) + χ(θ − α)



















(because α < 1).
Therefore, line A always intersect the η axis to the right of the line B.
A.5 Slope of line A
To be written
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22Figure 1: Stability regions in the (η,σ) space.













23Figure 2: Stability regions change with χ.






















24Figure 3: Stability regions change with φ.






















25Figure 4: Stability regions change with θ.
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